你、我、我们:情绪经验的共享

You,Me,and We:The Sharing of Emotional Experiences

在考察近来有关集体意向性和我们-意向的本质和状况的哲学工作时,我们惊讶地发现,学者们在如下方面投入了巨大的精力:分析联合行动的结构,以及确定那些诸如,一起散步或一起粉刷房子的意向是否可以被还原为某种形式的我-意向性。但是,很少有研究致力于对共享的情感和情绪进行分析。这是令人遗憾的,不仅因为情绪共享极有可能在发展上先于联合行动,并在逻辑上也比后者更为基础,而且还因为它可能建构起一种与他人相处的方式,如果希望更好地理解“我们”的本质,就需要对此进行研究。在本文中,我的主要目的是回答以下问题:我们-经验,即作为“我们”之部分的经验,是否预设、先于、保留或取消了自我-与他者-经验之间的差异?为了达成这个目标,我将更深入地研究情绪共享,并利用在当前社会本体论中经常被忽视的资源,即经典现象学和当代社会认知研究中的洞见。

When surveying recent philosophical work on the nature and status of collective intentionality and we-intentions,it is striking how much effort is spent on analysing the structure of joint action and on establishing whether or not the intention to,say,go for a walk or paint a house together is reducible to some form of Iintentionality.Much less work has been devoted to an analysis of shared affects and emotions.This is regrettable,not only because emotional sharing in all likelihood is developmentally prior to and logically more basic than joint action,but also because it might constitute a way of being together with others,which we need to study if we wish to better understand the nature of the we.In the present contribution,my primary aim will be to offer an answer to the following question:does the we-experience,the experience of being part of a we,presuppose,precede,preserve,or abolish the difference between self-and other-experience?In pursuing this task,I will take a closer look at emotional sharing and draw on resources that are too frequently ignored in current social ontology,namely insights found in classical8 phenomenology and in contemporary research on social cognition.