戴维森“理由因果论”的困难与出路

The Difficulty and Outlet of Davidson’s Causal Theory of Reason

在理由与行动的关系上,戴维森主张二者之间是心理物理因果关系,这会遇到两个困难:第一,"理由倾向论"将行动理解为倾向的例示同样可以解释行动意图,能够解释行动意图不足以说明理由本身具有因果效力。第二,如何理解理由本身的因果效力?如果在类型层面理解,则"理由因果论"无法区分于"理由倾向论",因为起解释作用的都是因果律则;如果在标记事件层面理解,则"理由因果论"中的"因果"徒有虚名,因为顺着金在权等人的批评会发现标记事件之间的因果关系缺乏实质的语义内容。拯救"理由因果论"可能的出路是将"理由导致行动"视为一条"范导原则",这一方面担保了每个现实具体的行动都可被归因,另一方面引导行动解释中的其他解释与因果解释相兼容。

Davidson argues that there is a psychophysical causal relationship between reason and action.There are two difficulties:first,the intentions of action can also be explained by the dispositional theory of reason.So being able to explain the intentions of action is not enough.Second,how to understand the causal efficacy of the reason itself?If understanding in the sense of type,then the causal theory of reasons cannot be distinguished from the dispositional theory of reasons.Because the law of causation plays an interpretive role in this interpretation models.If understanding in the sense of token events,then causes and effects have no semantic contents.The possible way to save the causal theory of reasons maybe is regarding"reason caused act"as a regulative principle.On one hand,it guarantees that every specific act can be attributed.On the other hand,it guides other explanations in action explanation to be compatible with causal explanation.