超额义务与美德

Supererogation and Virtue

一位行动者能否以一种道德上值得称赞的方式来承担"超额"的义务?本文将尝试对这种美德提供一个最佳说明。本文在开篇勾勒了亨利·西季威克的观点:超额义务将牵扯出一个不道德悖论——超额义务似乎允许一个道德上无可挑剔的主体,可以不那么道德地做她可能会做的事。于是,超额工作行为的条件出现了,并且基督教教义中的此类观念萌芽也得到了解释。将义务与适切性相关联的亚里士多德主义的美德观也应运而生,并且它们主张自己的观点能够更好地接纳超额义务的观念。厄姆森在其文章《圣人与英雄》中支持了超额义务理论,本文将在结尾处对厄姆森的论证做出回应。

This chapter concerns whether the best account of virtue will involve the idea that an agent can"go beyond"duty in a morally praiseworthy way.The chapter begins by outlining Henry Sidgwick’s view that supererogation involves an immoral paradox,since it seems to allow a morally blameless agent to do less morally than she might.The conditions of supererogatory action are set out,and the origins of the idea in Christian doctrine are explained.An Aristotelian account of virtue,relating duty to"fittingness,"is set out,and claimed to be preferable to an account allowing for supererogation.The chapter closes with responses to Urmson’s arguments in favor of supererogation in his famous paper"Saints and Heroes."