权利无法新兴吗?——论既有权利具体化的有限性

Aren’t the New-Rights Impossible? The Justification of the Restricted Specification of Existing Rights

有学理意义的新兴权利概念要能体现出新兴权利的重要意义。符合该条件的新兴权利概念命题有情境命题和领域命题。因为辩护领域命题是一种辩护情境命题的方式,所以有学理意义的新兴权利概念命题只有情境命题。可以通过论证权利的有限具体化理论辩护情境命题。论证该理论就是要解释:(1)权利所要促进的事物有很多类别;(2)证成既有权利的理由类别没有穷尽所有能证成权利的理由类别。一种内置于契约主义道德框架的利益论解释了(1)。至于(2),就道德权利而言,证成既有权利的理由类别已经穷尽了所有能证成权利的理由类别;就法律权利而言,既有权利由于受制于法体系本身的规定,经常无法通过具体化的方式来应对新情境中新出现的权利需求。概言之,法律权利的有限具体化理论能够成立。

A meaningful concept of new-rights needs to imply the significance of new-rights.The conceptual theses that meet this condition are the context thesis and the realm thesis.Since defending the realm thesis is a way to defend the context thesis,the context thesis is the only meaningful thesis of new-rights.The defense of the context thesis can be carried out by demonstrating the theory of restricted specification of rights.Demonstrating this theory is to explain:(a)what rights mean to promote involves many categories;(b)the categories of reasons that justify existing rights do not exhaust all the categories of reasons that can justify rights.An interest theory built into the moral framework of contractualism explains(a).As for(b),as far as moral rights are concerned,the existing rights have exhausted all the categories of reasons that can justify rights;as far as legal rights are concerned,the existing legal rights are subject to the provisions of the legal system itself,so it is not unusual that they are unable to respond to changes in new situations through their specification.Generally,the theory of restricted specification of legal rights can be established.