政府审计能抑制国有企业“脱实向虚”吗?——基于审计署审计结果公告的实证分析

Can National Audit Restrain State-owned Enterprises from “Shifting from Real to Virtual”?Based on National Audit Reports

作为国家治理体系的重要组成部分,政府审计在防范金融风险、助力经济高质量发展方面发挥着重要作用。立足于中国实体企业金融化水平不断上升的背景,文章以2008—2020年A股国有上市公司为研究样本,从过度金融化的视角考察政府审计对国有企业“脱实向虚”的治理效应。研究发现,政府审计能够显著抑制国有企业的过度金融化水平。政府审计的威慑力度与揭示力度越大,对国有企业过度金融化的抑制作用越强。进一步研究发现,政府审计能够通过提高固定资产投资比重,抑制国有企业“脱实向虚”;在代理问题较为严重的国有企业样本中,政府审计的抑制作用更强。文章从国有企业过度金融化的视角拓展了政府审计的治理效应研究,对于优化国有企业资产配置、完善公司治理具有一定的启示意义;同时也丰富了企业金融化的相关文献,为微观企业“脱实向虚”的监管与治理提供了经验证据。

As an important part of the national governance system,government audit plays a key role in preventing financial risks and promoting high-quality development.Based on the background of the increasing financialization of enterprises in China,this paper takes A-share state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as the research sample,and investigates the governance effect of government audit on state-owned enterprises from the perspective of excessive financialization.According to the public entrusted economic responsibility theory,maintaining national economic security is one of the tasks for audit institutions.Government audit can directly reveal the illegal behaviors of audited enterprises.From the perspectives of deterrence function and disclosure function,for one state-owned enterprise,the deterrence strength of multiple audits is higher than that of single audit.With the enhancement of audit deterrence,the management of state-owned enterprises will be more standardized and stable in financial decision-making.The more violations related to financialization are revealed in audit results,the stronger the governance effect of government audit on“shifting from real to virtual”will be.It is found that government audit can significantly restrain the excessive financialization of state-owned enterprises.The greater the deterrence and disclosure of government audit,the stronger the restraining effect on the excessive financialization of state-owned enterprises.Further research shows that the governance effect of government audit on excessive financialization only exists in a short term,and there is a certain spillover effect.The fixed asset investment of state-owned enterprises plays an intermediary role,which shows that government audit can reduce the risk of fixed asset investment,optimize the resource allocation of state-owned enterprises,and restrain“shifting from real to virtual”.In the samples of state-owned enterprises with serious agency problems,government audit has a stronger restraining effect on excessive financialization.The marginal contributions of this paper are as follows:(1)It expands the theoretical framework of the governance effect of government audit.This paper reveals the governance effect of government audit on the excessive financialization of state-owned enterprises.(2)It enriches the research on the influencing factors of the excessive financialization of state-owned enterprises.Different from the existing literature on the factors affecting enterprise financialization from the aspects of monetary policy,bank-enterprise relationship and management characteristics,this paper focuses on the impact of government audit on the excessive financialization of state-owned enterprises and expands the perspective of the research on the financialization of real enterprises.(3)The findings also have certain practical significance for strengthening government audit governance,optimizing the asset allocation of state-owned enterprises,and improving corporate governance.