Gettier反例的误导性——语义失败与语义混淆

The Misleading Nature of Gettier Cases Semantic Failure and Semantic Confusion

普遍观点认为,Gettier反例有效地挑战了传统的知识分析(JTB),而Mizrahi等学者尝试从语义学的角度探讨这些反例中的误导性。根据Kripke对于“说话者指称”和“语义学指称”的区分,Mizrahi认为在Gettier反例中存在一种语义失败的现象:于某个认知主体而言,某个指示词的说话者指称未能满足其作为语义学指称的条件。然而,本文首先指出Mizrahi对Kripke理论的应用存在误解。其次,即便Mizrahi对Kripke理论的理解与应用是准确的,他所主张的语义失败也不普遍存在于所有的Gettier反例之中。最后,本文基于Mizrahi的论述,进一步探讨了Gettier反例中的另一种语义问题——语义混淆:反例声称认知主体知道的那个命题既有认知主体的意向所指,也有实际所指。因此,Gettier反例仍然具有误导性。

The prevailing view is that Gettier cases effectively challenge the traditional analysis of knowledge(JTB),and scholars like Mizrahi have attempted to explore the misleading aspects of these cases from a semantic perspective.Drawing on Kripke's distinction between“speaker's reference”and“semantic reference”,Mizrahi argues that there exists a phenomenon of semantic failure in Gettier cases:for a given cognitive agent,the speaker's reference of a certain term fails to meet the conditions for its semantic reference.However,this paper first points out a misunderstanding in Mizrahi's application of Kripke's theory.Secondly,even if Mizrahi's understanding and application of Kripke's theory were accurate,the claimed semantic failure does not universally apply to all Gettier cases.Finally,based on Mizrahi's discussion,this paper further explores another semantic issue in Gettier cases—semantic confusion:the proposition that the cognitive agent is claimed to know has both the intentionality of the cognitive agent and the actual referent.Thus,Gettier cases remain misleading.