亚里士多德的实体分离问题

The Separation of Substance in Aristotle

分离作为实体标准之一向来是亚里士多德哲学中的基础问题。按照《形而上学》Z和H卷的基本观点,形式是首要实体,比复合物更是可分离者。但H 1复合物绝对地分离之说使一些学者认为形式不满足实体分离标准。本文分析了分离之为实体标准的根据,区分了分离的三个层次和对象,对H 1提出了一种新解释。新解释辩护了亚里士多德基本观点的一致性,说明形式与复合物具有何种分离取决于它们是主体实体的方式。形式是偶性在描述上的主体,满足实体分离标准,具有本体分离性和描述分离性。绝对地分离只表明有生成毁灭的复合物是偶性变化的主体。复合物并不比形式更是分离实体。

Separation,as one of the criteria for substance,has always been a fundamental issue in Aristotle's Metaphysics.In Metaphysics Books Z and H,the substance,the form has better credentials to be substance than the composite does.However,in H 1,Aristotle states that the composite is absolutely separate and the form is separate in definition.This anomalous passage has led some scholars to argue that the priority accorded form cannot be standard ontological separation.By analyzing the basis for the criterion of separation,this essay distinguishes three ways and objects of separation,and proposes a new interpretation of H 1.It defends the consistency of Aristotle's basic idea by showing that the type of separability that form and composite possess depends on how they are considered as subjects.Form can be standard ontological separation and definitional separation because it is subject of accidents in definition.Absolute separation merely indicates that the composite with coming-to-be and the passing away is subject of accidental change.The composite is not prior to the form on ontological separation.