智慧与认识论求真主义

Wisdom and Veritism

当代智慧理论在是否要求信念为真的问题上陷入争论。然而,根据认识论的求真主义传统,真是根本性认知善,智慧作为最高或最宝贵的认知善,理应始终得到真所提供的认知价值支撑。因此,争议的出现意味着求真主义直觉产生了动摇,一种可能的挑战是以智慧取代真的认识论根本地位。本文考察了三种为此辩护的论证策略,分别基于(i)形成智慧是求真后的最终探究步骤;(ii)智慧理论无需设置“真”条件;以及(iii)智慧的核心是超越于一般真的特殊真。其中,(iii)可行。选择(iii)意味着对求真主义做出修改,将根本性认知善由所有真进一步限定至由智慧所要求的特殊真。在兼顾真与智慧两种探究目标之余,这能够解释为何对智慧之人的信念要求会出现异议。

According to veritism,truth is the fundamental epistemic good.Therefore,as the highest or the most prized epistemic good,wisdom is supposed to gain support from truth.However,a current debate on theorization of wisdom questions the necessity of wise people holding true beliefs,and thereby introduces a potential threat to veritism that wisdom may be more fundamental than truth.We will examine three arguments for this idea:(i)wisdom closes inquiry;(ii)wisdom does not require beliefs to be true.And(iii)the core of wisdom is a superior sub-set of truth.I argue that the third approach is feasible and leads to a revision of veritism by narrowing the fundamental epistemic good from truth to truth that is necessitated by wisdom.By embracing(iii)we recognize both wisdom and truth as the goals of inquiry,offering an explanation for the differing opinions on the requirements of wise people's beliefs.