一种认知错论的可能尝试

A Possible Attempt of Epistemic Error Theory

实在论者认为质疑绝对道德命令的道德错论将会导致认知错论,原因是认知理由和道德理由同样包含了绝对的规范性权威,并把认知错论看作一种普遍的认知怀疑主义,认为其会导致失去一切认知结果的消极后果,实在论者利用这一点降低道德错论的可靠性。作为错论者,回应这种攻击的关键在于,说明道德错论蕴含部分的认知怀疑主义而非普遍的认知怀疑主义,拒绝包含绝对规范性权威的认知理由并不代表拒绝一切认知理由。本文尝试建立一种相对的认知制度,利用“证据支撑关系”消解认知规范性可能具有的怪异特征,并将其作为制度内部的认知理由,在承认道德错论将会导致认知错论的基础上,继续对规范性权威进行质疑,尝试为道德错论作辩护。

Moral realists believe that moral error theory questioning absolute moral reasons will lead to epistemic error theory,because epistemic reasons are like moral reasons,contain absolute normative authority,and regard epistemic error theory as a global epistemic skepticism,believing that it will lead to the negative consequences of losing all epistemic results.Realists use this to reduce the reliability of moral error theory.As an error theorist,the key to responding to this attack is to clarify that moral error theory implies local epistemic skepticism rather than global skepticism.Rejecting the epistemic reasons that contain normative authority does not mean rejecting all epistemic reasons.This paper attempts to establish a relative epistemic institution,using the“evidential support relations”to eliminate the possible queerness of epistemic normativity,and using it as a epistemic reason within the institution,continue to question the normative authority on the basis of conceding that moral error theory will lead to epistemic error theory,to preserve the epistemological property and try to defend moral error theory.