经验与世界为何不能为信念提供辩护?——戴维森融贯论的形而上学根源剖析

Why Cannot Belief Be Justified by Experience or the World?A Diagnosis of The Metaphysical Roots of Davidson's Coherentism

经验能否为信念提供辩护是哲学中的一个根本问题。戴维森否认经验能为信念提供辩护,进而否认世界对信念的规范性约束。麦克道尔指出,戴维森因持有自然—规范二元论而无法理解作为自然现象的经验如何可能具有概念内容,从而把经验及世界排除出规范性的领域。然而,麦克道尔的分析并不全面。事实上戴维森否定经验和世界的辩护作用还有两个原因:其一,他反对形而上学实在论;其二,他持有对象—事实二元论。反对形而上学实在论使戴维森否定了世界的规范性作用,而只把规范性关系限定在具有命题态度的主体之间。对象—事实二元论则让他无法理解,经验在无命题态度的情况下如何有命题内容。走出戴维森式的否定需要以一种更加恰当的方式反对形而上学实在论,并且需要瓦解对象—事实二元论。

It is one of the most fundamental issues in philosophy whether experience can justify belief.Donald Davidson denies that experience plays any justificatory role and further renounces the normative constraint of the world on belief.John McDowell points out that Davidson,because of his nature-norm dualism,fails to see how experience as natural phenomenon could have conceptual content,which results in his excluding experience from the normative realm.Although McDowell's diagnosis is accurate and profound,it is not complete.Indeed,there are two other roots which influence Davidson's thoughts,i.e.his objections to metaphysical realism and his implicit insistence on object-fact dualism.Objections of metaphysical realism leads Davidson to deny the normative role of the world and to confine normative relations to subjects with propositional attitudes.The object-fact dualism makes him fail to see how experience could have propositional content in the absence of a propositional attitude.Avoiding these Davidsonian denials requires a more appropriate rejection of metaphysical realism and the rejection of object-fact dualism.