摘要
贝克莱视日常物体为感觉观念的聚合(collection),也就是一类私人事物。这样一来,贝克莱对物体的看法便与常识相冲突:我们不会认为物体是仅对自己开放的心灵图像,而是会认为它们是公共的。鉴于他对自己学说的“最与常识相合”的评价,贝克莱并不能坦然接受这一冲突。所以,为解决这一冲突以更宽容地理解贝克莱,我们需要为作为观念聚合的物体找回公共性的依据,这便是本文的目标。学者们提供了六个主要方案以实现这一目标,其中,“公共性”都被理解为“公共可知觉性”。我们将首先逐一检查这些方案,并展示它们在不同方面的缺陷。进而,我们将论证,相比于“公共可知觉性”,把“公共性”理解为“公共可验证性”是更合适的,我们更应尝试在贝克莱的框架中为后者而非前者寻找根据。最终,提取来自上述主要尝试的思想资源,我们将下结论:贝克莱式物体在“可验证性”的意义上是公共的。
Berkeley regards ordinary objects as collections of ideas,as a kind of private entity.In that case,Berkeley's view on objects is in conflict with the commonsense:We do not take objects to be mental images merely opening for ourselves,on the contrary,we believe that they are public.Because Berkeley's comment on his own system,“most agreeable to commonsense”,he cannot stand well with the conflict.Thus,in order to reconcile the conflict and to understand Berkeley more charitably,we need to find the evidence for objects as collections of ideas to be public in his doctrine.This is the goal of the article.There are six main solutions in the same aim provided by scholars,in which“publicity”are all understood as“public perceivability”.I will examine these solutions in turn,and show that they are short in different aspects.Then,I will argue,taking“publicity”to mean“public verifiability”,rather than“public perceivability”,is a more appropriate approach,we should then look for evidences in Berkeley's system for it.Finally,on the basis of resources extracted from the above solutions,I will conclude:Berkeleian objects are public in the sense of“verifiability”.
作者
袁竟耕
YUAN Jinggeng(Department of Philosophy,Northwest Normal University)
出处
《清华西方哲学研究》
2022年第2期104-118,共15页
Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy
关键词
贝克莱式物体
感觉观念
公共性
Berkeleian Objects
ideas of sensation
publicity