Kant's Argument for Freedom in the Groundwork:A Response to Ameriks's Critique

In this paper,I intend to reconstruct Kant's argument for freedom in the Groundwork in light of Ameriks's challenge.Ameriks worries that the freedom justified in the Groundwork is merely phenomenological(Ameriks,2003:233).To defend Kant's argument against Ameriks's critique,I first specify phenomenological freedom into three kinds:(1)freedom is merely an illusion;(2)“free”actions are“internally”determined by sensible impulses;(3)freedom is necessitated by reason.I then argue that Kant successfully excludes the possibility of the second kind of phenomenological freedom and proves that the third kind does not undermine the concept of freedom.As for the first kind,I suggest that Kant cannot fully repudiate it.However,Kant offers enough reason to convince us of the opposite,viz.,reason has actual causal efficacy,can be rationally(coherently)presupposed.