对康德“我思”概念的一种现象学解读

A Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Concept “I think”

按照对康德"意识"学说的通行理解模式,康德对"意识"的研究是"形式的""抽象的"和"逻辑的"。然而当我们摆脱这种理解框架并引入现象学视角时,我们发现,康德"我思"概念中已经包含了"对象意识""自身意识"和"自我意识"这三种具体的意识种类或者说意识功能。"自身意识"和同一的"自我意识"依赖于作为"对象意识"的"先验统觉",因此康德能够将它们作为三个环节结合在"我思"概念中。康德的这些探讨构成胡塞尔现象学的重要先声。

According to the popular model of the interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of consciousness,the Kantian concept of consciousness is formal,abstract and logical.However,if we have got rid of this interpretive framework und introduce the phenomenological perspective,we could find out that the Kantian concept of"I think"contains three concrete sorts of consciousness:"phenomenal consciousness"("object-consciousness"),self-awareness and ego-consciousness.Both the self-awareness und the identical ego-consciousness are dependent on the object-consciousness,which is called by Kant"transcendental apperception".For that reason,Kant can combine them as three moments in the concept of"I think".This Kantian doctrine of consciousness can be seen as the initial stages of Husserlian phenomenology.