弥合裂隙:对于“一个针对康德先验观念论论证的旧有反驳”的新解答

Closing the Gap:A New Answer to an Old Objection Against Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism

康德的部分批评者认为,当康德声称空间和时间是我们的直观之形式的时候,他忽视了如下这种可能情况:空间和时间也可以是不依赖于心灵的外在世界之特征,由此我们的认知结构就和不依赖于心灵的外在世界之结构恰好相符合。这种针对康德的反驳被本文作者以及其他一些研究者称为"被忽视的可选反驳"或"被忽视的可选项问题"。Willaschek和Allais二人都是基于康德对"先天直观"的解释来回应这种反驳,但本文作者认为他们的解决方案并不足以驳倒这种反驳;而要想驳倒这一反驳,作者认为需要从"正确理解康德对显象和自在之物的区分"处着眼。^①.

Some critics of Kant hold that,when Kant claims that space and time are forms of our intuition,he has neglected the following possibility:space and time can also be features of mind-independent world,and in that case the structure of our cognition would correspond to that of the mind-independent world.This objection against Kant is titled by the author of this article and other scholars"the neglected alternative objection"or"problem of the neglected alternative".Both Willaschek and Allais base their answers to this objection on Kant’s interpretation of"a priori intuition",while the author of this essay does not think their solutions address this objection completely.According to the author,a correct understanding of Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves would be the key to solve this problem.