康德哲学中范畴是否在知觉中即已经扮演了角色?——对彼得·罗斯和约翰·麦克道尔的讨论

Do the Categories Already Play a Role in Perception in Kant’s Philosophy? ——Peter Rohs and John Mc Dowell

范畴是否在知觉中已经扮演了一个角色,这在康德诠释者那里存在不同的看法。例如,彼得·罗斯(Peter Rohs)论证支持知觉相对于知性的独立性(Unabh?ngigkeit)和自主性(Selbst?ndigkeit)。(1)想象力的直观综合必须能够立足于自身;诸图像(Bilder)和单个感官知觉(singul?re Sinne)必须先行于概念的应用(第一部分)。与之相对,麦克道尔反对知觉的这种自主性。如果将它设定为前提,那么知性则出现得太迟了(第二部分)。双方的论证都应该基于康德的文本加以探究(第三部分)。在这些讨论中,出现了一个事实上的问题,当今的,主要是美国的,(在心灵哲学和认知科学的框架下)关于认知机能(kognitive Funktionen)在知觉中有某种必然性的讨论遇到了一些和我们在康德那里所发现的非常相似的问题,只是似乎在康德研究圈之外的人并没有意识到这种相似性。

Whether the categories already play a role in perception is seen differently by Kant interpreters.Peter Rohs,for example,argues for independence and self-sufficiency of perception against the understanding.The intuitive synthesis of the imagination must be able to stand on its own feet,and images and"singular senses"precede the application of the concepts(Part 1).Mc Dowell,however,argues against such an independence of perception.If we presuppose them,the understanding would come too late(Part 2).The arguments of both sides should be examined according to the text of Kant(Part 3).Here exists a real problem.The present,mainly American discussion(in the framework of"philosophy of mind"and"cognitive science")about a possible necessity of cognitive functions in perception encounters similar problems as we already find in Kant,but it seems that outside Kant circles we are often not conscious of this similarity.