欧足联财政公平政策的竞争法分析——兼论中国足协“工资帽”制度的合法性

An analysis of competition law on the UEFA financial fair play regulations and on the legality of the CFA salary cap regulations

中国足协对球员工资进行限制的"限薪令"和对转会费进行控制的"转会调节费"在一定程度上借鉴了欧足联的财政公平政策,本文首先对欧足联的财政公平政策进行了介绍并与美国职业体育中的"工资帽制度"进行了比较,然后从竞争法角度对欧足联的财政公平政策进行分析,认为该政策从理论上违反了欧盟竞争法。本文从反垄断法角度对中国足协的工资帽制度进行了分析,认为球员工资帽虽然在理论上属于固定价格的限制竞争行为,但该制度与球队工资帽与转换调节费制度结合在一起在整体上具有促进竞争,提高职业足球竞争力的后果特别是与欧足联财政公平政策不同,中国足协并没有禁止球队股东的注资行为,因此中国足协的球队工资帽制度不会产生俱乐部阶层等级固化的现象。

Since the Chinese Football Association(CFA)introduces regulations of player salary cap and tax on excessive transfer fee by partly learning from its European counterpart,the Union of European Football Association(UEFA)which established the Financial Fair Play(FFP)regulations,this article starts with the introduction of UEFA FFP regulations and then compares them with the salary cap rules adopted by America’s major sports leagues.After that,the UEFA FFP regulations are analyzed from the perspective of the EU competition law,which supports the conclusion that those regulations theoretically violate the law.Analyzing the CFA salary cap regulations with antitrust law holds that player salary cap is an anti-competitive practice in theory for which fixes price.However,working with the club salary cap and the tax on transfer fee,the player salary cap regulations contribute to promoting competition on the whole,and making the sport more professional.Unlike the UEFA FFP regulations,the CFA have not enjoined shareholders of any football club from injecting capital.Therefore,the CFA club salary cap regulations will not lead to a stagnant football pyramid.