物格理论视角下人工智能的法律地位

The Legal Status of Artificial Intelligence:A Perspective from The Theory of Legal Objectivity

作为一种人造物,人工智能产品无须被拟制为法律主体。但随着智能机器技术的发展与应用的普及,人类与智能机器之间的关系可能会远较人类与一般物之间的关系更为复杂。为了妥善处理人工智能的法律地位问题,在民法上引入区分"伦理物"与"普通物"的"物格"理论是一种可能的应对方式。目前而言,人工智能产品仅仅是一种普通物。未来,随着智能机器与人类之间关系的变迁,一些特定智能产品的法律地位可能需要由普通物升格为伦理物,进而得到立法的特别保护,对此我们应当保持审慎的观察态度。

As one type of artefact,artificial intelligence shall never get the fictional status as legal agency.On the other hand,as social robot prevalent in our daily life,our relationship with intelligent robots may become much more complex than that with other object.Thus,the moral consideration for some certain types of robots may be necessary in the future.To handle this problem,we could establish the theory of"legal objectivity"to distinguish the"moral object"which may need special protection due to their ethic meaning from the"normal object".Today,artificial intelligence is just one of"normal object".In the future,we may need to elevate it from the rank of"normal object"to the rank of"moral object".But it will never be the case where artificial intelligence shall become legal agency.