论投资条约中最惠国条款的多边化作用及限度——基于同类规则适用的实证分析

The Multilateralizing Effect and Boundaries of MFN Clause in Investment Treaties:An Empirical Analysis on the Application of Ejusdem Generis

在国际投资条约实践中,最惠国条款的多边化影响日益受到关注。该条款的多边化作用机制体现在同类规则的效力上。只要符合同类规则的要求,最惠国条款就可以引入其他更优惠的条款,除非基础条约明确地作出另外规定。另一方面,同类规则也为最惠国条款的多边化作用内设了一定的限度。通过实证分析有关投资仲裁案例可以发现,同类规则支持绝大部分案例的裁决结果。但是,这些仲裁庭却把裁决理由或多或少地放在对实体条款与程序条款的区别对待,或者对缔约国意图的主观臆断上,从而引发一些不必要的争议,也侵蚀了最惠国条款实践的可预期性及正当性。

There is growing concern about the multilateralizing effect of most favored nation treatment(MFN)clauses in the practice of international investment treaties.The multilateralizing mechanism of this article is embodied in the legal effect of ejusdem generis.The MFN clause could introduce other more favorable clauses,provided that it conform to ejusdem generis,unless the basic treaty explicitly provides otherwise.However,the rule has set some boundaries for this multilateralizing effect.Through empirical analysis of arbitration cases,we could find that the majority of cases result is supportedby ejusdem generis.However,these arbitral tribunals have more or less putthe reasons for finding on the distinction between substantive clause and procedural clause,or on the subjective assumption of the intention of the contracting States,resulting in much unnecessary controversies and erosion of predictability and legitimacy of the practices of MFN.