高管薪酬粘性区间效应及其影响机理研究

Research on Interval Effect of Executive Compensation Stickiness and Its Influence Mechanism

以2013~2016年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验高管薪酬业绩敏感性及薪酬粘性区间效应,并探索其形成机理,发现如下三点结论:①高管薪酬与公司业绩并非简单线性相关,而是呈"中间陡、两端平缓"的关系。②高管薪酬业绩敏感性与高管薪酬粘性存在区间效应:业绩适中时高管薪酬业绩敏感性较强,薪酬粘性不显著;业绩过高或过低时高管薪酬业绩敏感性减弱,薪酬粘性特征凸显。③多维度业绩评价差异性和盈余管理加剧了高管薪酬粘性特征,证明两者是高管薪酬粘性区间效应形成的重要影响机制。

Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2016 as research object,the paper tested the interval effect of executive’s compensation performance sensitivity and compensation stickiness,and explored their formation mechanism.Three conclusions are as follows:①The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance is not simply linear,but"steep in the middle and smooth at both ends".②There is an interval effect for executive’s compensation performance sensitivity and compensation stickiness,that the compensation performance sensitivity is stronger but the compensation stickiness is not significant when the performance is moderate,however,when the performance is too high or too low,the compensation performance sensitivity is weakened and the characteristic of compensation stickiness is prominent.③The difference of multidimensional performance evaluation results and the earnings management significantly aggravate the characteristics of executive compensation stickiness,which proves that they are the important formation mechanism for the interval effect of executive compensation stickiness.