国企股权激励与企业绩效关系研究——以我国国有上市企业为例

Research on the Relationship Between Equity Compensation and Enterprise Performance in State Owned Enterprises——Take China’s State-owned Listed Enterprises as an Example

股权激励是缓解现代股份制公司委托-代理问题的重要手段,在我国的经济体系中,国有企业是关系国计民生的重要组成部分,因此国企高管的股权激励问题尤为重要。对此,本文结合现实与政策背景,研究2005~2018年中国国有上市企业股权激励与企业绩效的关系。研究结果显示:1.随着我国国企高管薪酬制度的逐渐完善,股权激励机制会推动企业综合绩效的提高;2.在目前两种常见的股权激励方式中,股票期权有利于实现企业绩效的可持续增长,而限制性股票由于具有惩罚性特征,会对企业绩效长期增长形成限制。这表明,引导和支持更多国有企业引入长效的股权激励机制,有利于国有企业的长期发展。

Equity compensation is an important method to alleviate the agent problem of modern joint-stock company.In China’s economic system,state-owned enterprise is an important part of the national economy and plays an important role in improving people’s livelihood,so the issue of equity compensation for state-owned enterprise executives is particularly important.In this regard,combined with the reality and policy background,this paper studies the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance of China’s state-owned listed enterprises from 2005 to 2018.The results show that:1)with the gradual improvement of the executive compensation system in China’s state-owned enterprises,the equity incentive mechanism can improve the comprehensive performance of enterprises;2)in the two common equity incentive methods,stock option is conducive to improve the performance of enterprises.However,restricted stocks are detrimental to the long-term growth of enterprises because of their punitive characteristics.The findings show that guiding and supporting more state-owned enterprises to introduce long-term equity compensation mechanism is conducive to the long-term development of state-owned enterprises.