时间的构成与认知:杰尔的时间人类学理论内核述论

The Composition of Time and Time Cognition:A Review of the Theoretical Core of Gell’s Anthropology of Time

人类的时间观念何以异同是人类学时间研究的一个基本论题。对时间构成与时间认知的理解则左右着人类学家们对此论题的探究。20世纪90年代初,英国人类学家阿尔弗雷德·杰尔在继承与批判既往人类学家之时间论的基础上,综合多学科知识,析分出了作为事件之先后次序的客观时间("B系列"时间),作为过去、现在、未来意识的主观时间("A系列"时间),以及由主观时间模拟客观时间而生成的时间地图,并基于三者关系构建了一种普世的时间认知机制。杰尔认为,人类的时间认知作为人类基本认知机制运作的一种附带结果,在机制上具有普同性,而时间地图的内容则会随着人类经验与实践而变化,因此,人类学的时间研究应以时间认知机制之普同性为基础,注重探究时间地图之内容差异的社会文化根由。杰尔对时间的构成与认知的讨论是其时间人类学的理论内核,本文对其由来、内涵与缺陷进行了述论,以供后续研究参考。

Alfred Gell ’s The Anthropology of Time,published in 1992,is the first highly systematic theoretical monographon the subject of time in the history of anthropology. In this book,Gell not only conducted a detailed critical review of previous anthropological studies on time,but also proposed his own anthropological theory of time. Since then,Gell ’s research on time has become a work that can hardly be ignored by any anthropologist who studies time. This paper gives a review of Gell’s analysis of the composition of time and time cognition,which is the theoretical core of his anthropology of time.Discussing the similarities and differences in the conceptions of time across societies and cultures forms the basic topic of The Anthropology of Time. In the late 1970 s,Maurice Bloch criticized early anthropologists’ view of the conception of time which was one totally determined by society and culture. He then proposed a binary epistemology of time. Bloch maintains that human time cognition is two fold: pragmatic sequences that produce a linear or durational time concept,which is universal time cognition;and ritualized sequences that produce various non-linear or distorted durational time concepts,and which are time cognitions that vary from society to society.Gell followed Bloch ’s view that human time cognition has universality. Gell claimed that it was precisely because Durkheim confused the study of collective representation of time with the study of human time cognitive ability,that initiated the influential view that human time cognition is totally different from culture to culture,which,in turn,exoticized the time concepts of non-Western modern people. In Gell ’s view,although people may represent time in different ways,human time cognition should be universal. Therefore,the sociocultural time relativism of anthropology should be based on a universal time cognition,instead of extending it to the extent of extreme time relativism.However,Gell claimed that Bloch ’s dichotomy of time cognition is invalid,and that Bloch had not provided a clear demonstration of how universal time cognition is possible.Gell believes that the main reason why anthropologists ’ discussions of time were insufficient is because they were not very clear about philosophical ideas on time. Therefore,he tried to examine different philosophical theories of time,choose a specific coherent philosophical account of time,and build a universal time cognitive model based on it,which he thought may be able to eliminate the confusion caused by the "mystery"of time and stabilize the basis of anthropological time studies.Richard M. Gale divided the philosopher’s ideas on time into an A-series and B-series based upon the famous division of an A series time and B series time made by Cambridge analytic philosopher John Mc Taggart. Gell draws on this division,and divides all previous theories of time( not limited to the field of philosophy) into two types. Following the construct of Cambridge analytic philosopher David H. Mellor,Gell claimed himself a "moderate" B-series supporter. Gell first analyzed the composition of the B-series time. He maintained that things extend in space but not in time,so,as such,they do not have temporal attributes;whereas events represent changes in things,and it is the succession of events that constitutes the B-series time. The B-series time is an objective time that excludes the role of human subjective consciousness,so it does not reveal past,present,or future directly. Secondly,Gell reconciled Edmund Husserl’s theory of internal time consciousness with Ulric Neisser’s theory of perception process,thereby presenting what constitutes A-series time. A-series time consists of the past,present,and future consciousness unified into the "now",which informs our feelings of time passing or duration. In addition,Gell pointed out that the convergence between Neisser ’s theory of perceptual cycles and Husserl’s theory of internal time consciousness implicates that human time consciousness is not a special type of perception undertaken by special purpose or any specific time-perceiving sense;it is actually an incidental feature of the general cognition process. Next, Gell constructed a general model of time cognition by encapsulating the two kinds of time into a structural relationship of objective time-cognitive mechanism-subjective time. In Gell’s view,objective time is the basis of subjective time,but human beings can only reach objective time through subjective time flowing in the past,present,and future consciousness. Although real objective time is not directly accessible to humans,with practice and the accumulation of experience,people in different eras and regions have gradually summarized a variety of subjective quasi-objectivetimes. Gell called these surrogates of real objective time "time maps ". In his view,time maps are where humans may have differences in time concepts based on sharing the same basic time cognition,and where anthropologists’ social-cultural time relativism could be settled.Gell’s analysis of the constitution of time and the construction of a general model of time cognition is not only a tentative reconciliation between subjective time and objective time that has long existed in previous time studies( not limited to anthropology),but also a direct answer to the anthropological question of whether human cognition of time or concept of time are universal. However,Wendy James and David Mills pointed out that Gell’s approach is not cultural-centric,but rather intellectualist. The general model of time cognition he built is based on the perspective of the individual,and it may not suitable for interpreting time concepts of people from non-Western societies. Another critic,Matt Hodge,thought that Gell’s conception of the B-series incorporates a spatialized conception of linear time that is too western in character of be of value to the cross-cultural anthropological project. In short,these criticisms are a reminder that Gell’s general model of time cognition may not so universal as he liked to claim,and that the problem of whether human time cognition is universal or different has not been solved satisfactorily.