摘要
从立法论的角度来看,东道国在条约中规定最惠国条款的目的是促进东道国的利益,而非减损其利益,这是最惠国条款能够在国际经贸领域得以产生和发展的内在根源和动力。最惠国条款适用于国际投资争端解决程序的实践将产生强制仲裁的法律后果,严重减损了东道国的利益:增大东道国被诉的风险、损害东道国的公共利益、规避了东道国同意仲裁的前置条件、创设了东道国的仲裁合意。这种实践损害了东道国接受最惠国条款的正常预期利益,背离了最惠国条款的目的。
From the legislative point of view,the host country in the treaty accept MFN clause in order to promote the interests of the host country,rather than detract from its interests,this is the MFN clause to the emergence and development of internal source and power in the field of international trade.The MFN’s application to international investment dispute settlement will have the practice of compulsory arbitration,seriously affect the interests of the host country:increase the risk of the host country,prejudice the public interest,to circumvent the host country agreement preconditions for arbitration,the arbitration agreement of the creation of the host country.The practice will damage the host country’s acceptance of MFN clause,Departing from the aim of MFN clause.
出处
《贸大法律评论》
2018年第1期205-217,共13页
Uibe Legal Science
基金
司法部国家法治与法学理论研究项目“‘一带一路’倡议下国际投资争端解决机制改革问题研究”(批准号:18SFB5016)
关键词
最惠国条款
投资争端解决
强制仲裁
MFN
investment dispute settlement
compulsory arbitration