少数股东损益是一种新的盈余管理手段吗?

Is Non-controlling Interest a New Method of Earnings Management?

与现有文献研究的应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理两种盈余管理手段不同,文章发现了一种鲜被提及的盈余管理手段——操纵少数股东损益以提升归属于母公司股东的净利润。研究发现,当公司有强烈盈余管理动机即母子公司组成的企业集团发生微亏时,归属于母公司股东的净资产收益率(ROE)与归属于少数股东的ROE的差额与上年相比显著扩大,说明公司有可能将集团亏损转移至非全资子公司,以避免归属于母公司股东的ROE出现亏损。这一效应在少数股东权益比例较大、母子公司之间存在关联交易、信息不透明度较高、市场化程度较低时更为显著。应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理讨论的是在某一个期间企业如何把“蛋糕”做大或做小,而少数股东损益是在给定“蛋糕”大小的情况下,如何通过切“蛋糕”来实现归属于母公司股东的净利润扭亏为盈。这是一种新的盈余管理范式。文章的发现丰富和拓展了盈余管理手段的相关文献。

Different from extant literature on the topics about accrual earnings management and real earnings management,this paper finds a rarely mentioned method of earnings management called manipulating non-controlling interests to increase net profit attributing to the parent.The result shows that when business groups announce a slight loss,which means that business groups have a strong incentive to manipulate earnings,the difference between return-on-equity(ROE)attributing to the parent and ROE attributing to non-controlling shareholders is larger than that of last year.This finding shows that business groups may shift the loss to not-wholly-owned subsidiaries to avoid loss of ROE attributing to the parent.This effect is more pronounced in firms with large minority shareholder equity proportion,related-party transactions between parent and subsidiaries,high information opacity,and low degree of marketization.Accrued earnings management and real earnings management mainly focus on how to make the cake.But manipulating non-controlling interest is concerned about how to split the cake,which is a new form of earnings management.The findings of this paper enrich and develop the relevant literature on earnings management.