独立董事信息获取与高管薪酬合理性——来自股东大会的经验证据

Independent Directors’ Information Acquisition and Rationality of Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from Shareholders’ Meeting

企业真实信息是独立董事正确决策的基础。文章利用独立董事参加股东大会的特定场景,考察独立董事从中自主获取信息与高管薪酬合理性的关系。结果发现,独立董事能够通过参加股东大会获得真实信息并据此抑制高管薪酬,且独立董事的信息接收能力越强,其通过参加股东大会获得信息对高管薪酬的抑制作用就越明显。这种信息接收能力表现在独立董事处于第二任期、兼任薪酬委员会委员、具有财务会计专业背景等。机制检验表明,上述作用通过减少高管盈余操纵行为得以实现。研究结论表明,独立董事通过参加股东大会能够直接获取企业真实信息并提高监督效果,为资本市场完善投资者保护制度提供了直接证据。

Real information is the base of independent directors’right decisions.Using the setting that independent directors attend shareholders’meeting,this paper studies the relation between information that independent directors acquire from shareholders’meeting and rationality of executive compensation.The empirical results show that independent directors can acquire real operational information from shareholders’meeting to restrict executive compensation.The negative effect is more significant when independent directors’ability to obtain information is stronger,which is shown as independent directors’in second term,being as members of compensation committee or being as financial independent directors.The mechanism test shows that the above effects are achieved by reducing executives’earnings manipulation.This paper not only reveals independent directors can acquire real operational information from shareholders’meeting to monitor executives effectively,but also provides the direct evidence for the capital market to improve the investor protection system.