阿奎那行动理论中的意志与道德运气

Will and Moral Luck in Aquinas's Theory of Action

道德运气,特别是它与意志的关系为何的问题在现当代伦理学研究中占有重要的位置,这一问题在阿奎那思想中的位置也开始得到讨论。本文试图在梳理阿奎那和与之对立的阿伯拉尔主义在意志和道德运气关系问题上不同观点之间差异的基础上,通过将阿奎那道德行动理论阐释为一种质形论结构,意图指出,阿奎那以符合理性为行为善的形式准则,实际上允许道德运气作为行为的质料性部分参与到道德行动善恶大小的变化的影响中来。但这一对道德运气的容纳仅限于关涉此世的善恶行为,关涉来世的本质性的善恶行为则完全不受道德运气影响而仅仅取决于出自意志的善的意图。阿奎那行动理论的这一框架,既不否认道德运气的客观存在和对道德行动的影响,又有效限制了它对道德行动进行善恶判断的干扰,并在一定程度上保留了意志不受道德运气影响。

Moral luck,especially its relationship with will,occupies an important position in the contemporary ethics,and this problem in Aquinas'thought also gains its attention recently.This article attempts to interpret Aquinas's theory of moral action as a hylomorphic one on the basis of sorting out the differences between Aquinas and his opposite Abelardism on the relationship between free will and moral luck.Based on this interpretation,I point out that the conformity to reason as Aquinas's formal criterion of action as good actually allows moral luck as a material part of action to participate in the magnitude of morality of an action.But the tolerance of moral luck is limited to the good and evil actions related to this life.The essential good and evil actions related to the afterlife are not affected by moral luck at all,but only determined by the good intentions out of the will.This framework of Aquinas's theory of action does not deny the existence of moral luck and its influence on moral action,however,the theory effectively limits its interference in the morality of an human action,and protects the will from moral luck's effects to a certain extent.