摘要
阿皮亚、普莱森特和贝克都借用了库恩的“科学革命”概念来探讨“道德革命”的问题。他们认为道德变迁就意味着道德革命,并自然地将道德革命等同于道德进步。但本文认为,道德变迁实际上有两种形式,即“范式的拓展”和“革命性的变迁”。只有当“革命性的变迁”发生时,探讨“道德革命”才有意义。此外,本文通过对乌拉悯人文化事例的分析,阐明道德革命未必是道德进步,它也可能形成某种道德困境。因此,判定道德进步尤需谨慎。
Kwame Anthony Appiah,Nigel Pleasants and Robert Baker use Kuhn's concept of“scientific revolution”to discuss the problem of“moral revolution”.They all believe that moral change means moral revolution,therefore,naturally equate moral revolution with moral progress.However,this paper argues that,in fact,there are two forms of moral change,namely“paradigmatic expansion”and“revolutionary change”.It is only when the“revolutionary change”occurs that it makes sense to discuss“moral revolution”.In addition,through the case of Urapmin,this paper illustrates that moral revolution is not necessarily moral progress,but may also cause certain kinds of moral dilemma.Therefore,it should be especially cautious to define moral progress.
出处
《伦理学术》
2022年第2期42-52,共11页
Academia Ethica
基金
黑龙江省哲学社会科学专项项目(项目编号:19ZXD185)
黑龙江教育厅人文社会科学一般项目(项目编号:1351MSYYB018)的阶段性成果