企业高级主管权力与创新投资关系研究

Senior Executive Power and Corporate Innovation Investment

近年来,学术界持续关注创新问题研究,企业层面的研究多从公司治理结构的角度解释公司的创新现象,从管理层视角的研究则相对不足。CEO作为公司的高级主管,其权力结构既是构建创新治理机制的组成因素,又是公司实施创新战略以及获得创新绩效的执行主体。本文基于公司治理理论和行为代理理论,以中国制造业上市公司数据为样本,实证检验CEO权力与公司创新投资的关系。结果显示:公司决策权越集中于高级主管,越显示出较强的创新投资;首席执行官与董事长的双重角色有利于创新投资;分组数据结果显示,高级主管的任期越长公司的创新投入越多,非国有企业比国有企业越有可能进行创新投资。

In recent years,academia has continued to pay attention to innovative research.From the perspective of enterprise,most of the existing researches explain the innovation phenomenon from the perspective of corporate governance structure,in comparison,research from the management perspective is relatively insufficient.As the company’s senior executive,the CEO’s power structure is not only a component of the construction of an innovation governance mechanism,but also the executive body for the company to implement innovation strategies and obtain innovation performance.Based on the theory of corporate governance and behavioral agency theory,this paper uses the data of listed manufacturing companies in China as a sample to empirically test the relationship between CEO power and corporate innovation investment.The results show that the more the decision-making power of the company is concentrated in senior executives,the stronger the innovation investment is shown;the dual roles of CEO and chairman are conducive to innovation investment;the results of grouped data show that the longer the tenure of senior executives,the more companies will invest in innovation,and non-state-owned enterprises are more likely to invest in innovation than state-owned enterprises.