“霸座”行为何时休?——基于违约失信监管的博弈分析

When Will Act of “Occupying Seats” Stop?——Based on the Game Analysis of Supervision of Default and Credit Loss

"霸座"等违约失信现象频频发生引发了严重的社会信用危机,也给监管当局提出了具体要求。基于对违约失信监管的静态博弈模型和动态博弈模型研究分析显示:监管当局加大对违约失信行为的处罚力度,增加违约失信行为的成本,能有效降低违约失信行为的发生概率。继而,有针对性地提出违约失信监管的对策及建议,丰富、扩展了信用监管和失信惩戒的相关研究。

The frequent occurrence of acts of default and dishonesty,such as"occupying seats",triggered a serious social credit crisis and also brought specific requirements for the regulatory authorities.Based on the analysis of the static game model and the dynamic game model,the regulatory authorities’taking measures of stepping up in the punishment,increasing the cost of default and credit loss can effectively reduce the probability of its occurrence.Then,the countermeasures and suggestions for the supervision of default and dishonesty were put forward in a pointed manner,the related research on credit supervision and the punishment of dishonest acts was enriched and expanded.