反收购条款会诱发管理层短视行为吗——基于MD&A文本分析的经验证据

Do Anti-takeover Provisions Induce Management Short-sighted Behavior:Empirical Evidence Based on MD&A Text Analysis

随着资本市场的发展,恶意收购事件层出不穷,这也引起了上市公司对反收购条款的重视。本文以制定反收购条款的重要主体管理层为切入点,以我国2007年至2020年A股上市公司为研究对象,探讨反收购条款对管理层短视行为的影响。研究结果表明,公司设置反收购条款会诱发管理层的短视行为,该结论在稳健性检验后仍然成立。研究还发现,反收购条款会减少公司的长期资本支出和研发投入及产出,增加代理成本,降低管理层变更业绩敏感性和管理层薪酬业绩敏感性,损害公司价值,进一步验证了反收购条款对管理层短视行为的诱发作用。本研究丰富了反收购条款对管理层决策视域影响的相关研究,对上市公司反收购行为和管理层激励方法有一定的现实指导意义。

With the development of the capital marke,hostile takeovers have emerged one after another,which has also attracted the attention of listed companies to anti-takeover clauses.This article takes management,one of the important subjects in formulating anti-takeover clauses,as the starting point,and uses China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as the research object to explore the impact of anti-takeover clauses on management's short-sighted behavior.The research results show that the company's setting of anti-takeover clauses will induce management's short-sighted behavior,and this conclusion still holds true after the robustness test.The study also finds that antitakeover clauses reduce the firm's long-term capital expenditures and R&D inputs and outputs,increase agency costs,reduce the performance sensitivity of management changes and management compensation performance,and impair firm value.This further validates the induced effect of anti-takeover clauses on management's myopic behavior.The study enriches relevant research on the impact of anti-takeover clauses on management's decisionmaking horizons,and has certain practical guiding significance for listed companies'antitakeover behavior and management incentive methods.