政府隐性担保与会计稳健性

Implicit Government Guarantee and Accounting Conservatism

政府隐性担保在当今世界经济体中普遍存在,本文以中国最早的国有企业债券违约作为对预期政府担保的外生冲击来寻求识别和建立因果证据,观测政府隐性担保弱化对会计稳健性的影响。结果表明:(1)中国国有企业第一次债券违约事件后,随着政府隐性担保的预期下降,国有企业的会计稳健性显著提高,而在非国有企业组中,会计稳健性无显著变化。(2)政府隐性担保对国有企业会计稳健性的影响,在债务融资比重较高的样本组更为显著。进一步,政府隐性担保对会计稳健性的影响在地方国有企业中更为显著。

Implicit government guarantee is common in today's world economy.This paper seeks to identify and establish causal evidence by using China's earliest state‐owned enterprise bond default as an exogenous impact on expected government guarantee,and observes the impact of weakening government implicit guarantee on accounting conservatism.The results show that:(1)After the first bond default event of China's state‐owned enterprises,the accounting conservatism of state‐owned enterprises increased significantly with the decrease of the expectation of implicit government guarantee,while in the non‐state-owned enterprises group,there was no significant change in accounting conservatism.(2)The impact of government implicit guarantee on the accounting conservatism of stateowned enterprises is more significant in the sample group with a higher proportion of debt financing.Further,the impact of government implicit guarantees on accounting conservatism is more significant in local state‐owned enterprises.