银行债权治理与资产专用性“敲竹杠”:基于债务重组视角

Bank Debt Governance,Asset Specificity and Debt Restructuring——Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies with Financial Difficulties in China

本文以2008—2017年A股财务困境公司为样本研究资产专用性对债务重组的影响。研究发现:资产专用性越高,发生债务重组的概率越大,二者的显著正相关关系只发生在民营样本;银行参与治理的意愿越强,越能够促进资产专用性与债务重组的正相关关系。研究进一步发现,民营样本中研发投入存在中介效应,国有样本中政府补贴存在遮掩效应。资产专用性能够促进与金融类债权人进行法定债务重组。私下债务重组解决财务困境的市场预期更好,资产专用性高的样本通过私下债务重组更有利于解决财务困境,资产专用性低的样本通过法定债务重组更有利于解决财务困境。

This paper takes A-share financial distressed companies from 2008 to 2017 as samples to study the impact of asset specificity on debt restructuring.It is found that the higher the asset specificity is,the greater the probability of debt restructuring is,and the significant positive correlation between them only occurs in the private samples.The stronger the willingness of banks to participate in governance,the more positive correlation between asset specificity and debt restructuring can be promoted.Furthermore,it is found that R&D investment in private samples has intermediary effect,and government subsidies in state-owned samples have masking effect.Asset specificity can promote legal debt restructuring with financial creditors.The market expectation of private debt restructuring to solve financial distress is better.The sample with high asset specificity is more conducive to solve financial distress through private debt restructuring,and the sample with low asset specificity is more conducive to solve financial distress through legal debt restructuring.