审计师个人专长与大股东“掏空”行为

Auditor’s Personal Expertise and Large Shareholders’ Tunneling

本文基于委托代理理论、信号传递理论与"深口袋"理论,选取2010—2016年7年的A股上市公司的数据,对审计师个人专长对大股东的"掏空"行为的影响机制和市场化进程与产权性质的调节作用进行研究。研究结果表明,拥有个人行业专长的审计师对上市公司进行审计,能有效地对大股东的"掏空"行为起到抑制作用,在市场化程度高的地区审计师个人专长的抑制作用没有市场化程度低的地区有效;审计师个人专长的抑制作用在民营企业中并不显著。在克服可能的内生性问题和进行稳健性检验之后,实证结果仍然成立。

Based on the theories of agent theory,deep pocket theory and signal theory of capital market,using the data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2016,this paper studies the impact mechanism of auditor’s personal expertise on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders and the regulatory role of marketization process,and finally draws a conclusion.The results show that auditors with personal industry expertise can effectively inhibit the tunneling behavior of large shareholders.The inhibition of auditors’personal expertise in high-marketization areas is not as strong as in lowmarketization areas;the inhibition of auditors’personal expertise in state-owned enterprises is not as strong as in private enterprises.After conducting robustness test,the empirical results are still significant.