心-身问题、副词论与互补性

Mind-body Problem,Adverbialism and Complementarity

当代心灵哲学中,存在三个反驳物理主义的重要论证:可设想性论证、解释鸿沟与知识论证。可以利用副词理论来重新理解这三个论证,从而支持物理主义。副词理论认为主观体验并非某种非物理的实在,只是主体从自身内在的角度以特定的方式把握某一状态,而物理世界只是从第三人称视角的解释。第一人称视角和第三人称视角是两种不同的副词修饰方式。这两者之间的关系可以由波尔互补性原理来解释。这意味着虽然心理的与物理的在认识论上是不能相互还原的,但在本体论上并不存在两分。

There are three crucial arguments against physicalism in the contemporary philosophy of mind,the con⁃ceivability argument,the explanatory gap,and the knowledge argument.The paper tries to support physicalism by reinterpreting the three arguments with an adverbial theory.The adverbial theory argues that subjective experience is not some kind of nonphysical entity independent of the physical.It is a particular way for a subject to acquire a state.The particular way is the first-person perspective.In contrast,scientific theories try to explain the world from the perspective of the third-person.The first-person and third-person perspectives are two ways of adver⁃bial modification.They are complementary to each other in Bohr’s sense.The account implies that although mind and body cannot be reduced to each other epistemologically,they are still not dual ontologically.