罗素的判断理论错在哪里?——解读维特根斯坦的批评

What’s Wrong with Russell’s Theory of Judgement?——Interpretating Wittgenstein’s Criticisms

罗素的多元关系判断理论在1913年发展成了较成熟的一种形态,它把对“逻辑形式”的亲知作为理解命题的前提条件。维特根斯坦对这个理论提出了数次批评,使罗素的想法陷入“瘫痪”,并最终放弃了这个理论。维特根斯坦的批评怎样驳倒了罗素的判断理论?时至今日,问题仍然没有公认的答案。“标准解读”曾认为引入“逻辑形式”导致了倒退问题,从而无法与罗素的分支类型论相容;新近的解读者们则将问题归纳为“命题统一性问题”。文章分别提出了这两种解读存在的困难,并给出一种新解读。

Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment was developed into a relatively mature version in 1913,according to which the acquaintance of“Logical Form”is necessary to understand a proposition.Wittgenstein raised many criticisms against this theory,“paralyzing”Russell’s thought.Russell eventually rejected the theory.How do Wittgenstein’s criticisms defeat Russell’s theory of judgement?Until now,we still don’t have an uncontroversial answer to the question.“Standard Reading”held that introducing“Logical Form”can raise regress problem,so that it is not compatible with Russell’s ramified theory of types.Recent interpreters boil the question down to“the problem of unity of proposition”.In this article,I challenge both of these approaches and offer a new reading.