何为有认知价值的“分歧”?

What is the “Disagreements with Epistemic Value”?

何种“分歧”对知识分析才是有价值的?主流的观点聚焦“理想分歧”,并将其刻画为知识论中讨论“分歧问题”的统一模式。这一模式不仅对“分歧”的界定提出了一种强要求,而且容易忽视知识讨论中所面对的各种分歧的差异性。“理想分歧”模式不是界定“分歧”的唯一模式,从众多的分歧现象出发,我们认为需要用一种“源自信念自身的分歧”来补充有关分歧问题的讨论。相比前一模式它有如下优势:第一,可以涵盖前者无法讨论的分歧情境;第二,可以有效避免前者存在的可能取消分歧合理性的危险;第三,两种模式相结合可以更好地阐述知识论中“分歧问题”的指向和价值。

What kind of“disagreements”are valuable for knowledge analysis?The mainstream view focuses on“idealized disagreements”and describes it as a typical and unified model for discussing“disagreements”in epistemology.However,this model not only puts forward a strong requirement,but also easily ignores the differences of various disagreements in knowledge discussion.So the characterization of“disagreements”is not successful.The mode of“idealized disagreement”is not the only mode to define“disagreement”.Starting from many divergent phenomena,we propose a mode of“disagreement from belief itself”as a supplement.Compared with the former model,it has the following advantages:first,it can cover the divergent situations that the former cannot discuss;Second,it can effectively avoid the danger that the former may cancel the rationality of differences;Thirdly,the combination of the two models can better explain the direction and value of“disagreement problems”in epistemology.