证据是命题吗?

Does Evidence Consist of Propositions?

证据是哲学研究,特别是认识论研究的核心概念。但是,对其本性的考察一直没有受到应有的重视。证据本身是什么?它是由什么类型的事物构成的?威廉姆森从证据的功能角色出发,首先提出并论证了命题主义:证据是某些特定的命题。对此,一种挥之不去的疑虑是,命题不过是表征证据的工具,而非证据本身。换言之,证据其实是命题所表征的事件、事实或现象等。利特尔约翰与麦格鲁尝试补充威廉姆森的论证,以平息这种疑虑,但都难言成功。更全面的理论权衡也表明,坚持命题主义得不偿失,并不可取。余下有三种可行方案:(1)另寻它物,证据是其他什么东西;(2)多元主义,证据可以是多种东西;(3)取消主义,证据概念含糊不清,严肃的哲学研究理应抛弃之。

Evidence is a central concept in philosophy,especially in epistemology.But little has been said on the nature of it.What is evidence?What kind of things can evidence be made of?Starting from the functional roles of evidence,Timothy Williamson argued that evidence must be propositions.However,it seems that evidence might be not propositions,but something represented by propositions.Clayton Littlejohn and Timothy McGrew tried to defend Propositionalism,but I think they all failed.If we accept Propositionalism,what will be the cost and benefit?The trade-off shows that Propositionalism is unacceptable.Three ways left:(1)Find another thing;(2)Evidence Pluralism;(3)Evidence Eliminativism.