论布兰顿的实用主义指称理论

On Brandom’s Pragmatic Theory of Reference

在分析哲学传统下,真理问题与指称问题紧密相关。如果说存在一种所谓的实用主义真理论的话,那么也理应存在一种实用主义指称理论。实用主义真理论的主张是广为人知的;然而,实用主义的指称理论具有何种基本形态,这一点却很少得到关注。文章将专门讨论一种当代有影响力的实用主义指称理论,即布兰顿的回指替代指称理论。通过将指称关系规约为语言符号本身的回指替代,此理论破除了传统上理解指称概念的“语言-世界”框架,而将之替换为“语言-语言”框架。我们的分析将指出,这一新颖的理论主张与当前可见的几种指称收缩论存在根本区别——只有布兰顿的理论旨在贯彻实用主义的基本精神。但是,在其既有框架下,这一新指称论很难解答其本身所蕴含的两个基本元语义学问题,继而此理论到底在多大程度上忠实于实用主义哲学的基本精神,这一点仍然是存疑的。

In the Analytical philosophy tradition,the problems of truth and reference are tied together.If there is the so called Pragmatic account of truth,then there should have been a Pragmatic account of reference as well.The Pragmatic theory of truth is by now well-known,while the Pragmatic theory of reference goes largely unnoticed.Here we discuss an influential Pragmatic theory of reference,Brandom’s Anaphoric theory of reference.By reducing the reference relation to a“word-word”relation,this theory abandons the traditional“word-world”framework.As to be seen,this theory differs fundamentally from a couple of Deflationary accounts of reference–only this theory attempts to implement the Pragmatic idea to its end.Under its present framework,however,this theory is troubled by two meta-semantic problems,and as a consequence,it is doubtful how faithful this theory really is to the fundamental idea of Pragmatism.