融资融券交易能够提高业绩承诺完成率吗

Do Margin Trading and Short Selling Improve the Completion Rate of Performance Commitment?

本文以我国2011-2021年披露业绩承诺的A股上市公司为样本,考察了融资融券这一交易机制对业绩承诺完成率的影响。研究发现,相比于非融资融券标的公司,融资融券标的公司的业绩承诺完成率更低,且主要是由于融资交易引起的。机制分析表明,融资融券交易加剧了管理层短视行为、降低了机构投资者持股比例,进而导致业绩承诺完成率的下降。进一步研究发现,信息环境差、非国有控股和缺乏市场竞争的企业在成为融资融券标的后业绩承诺完成率显著更低。研究结论表明,我国融资融券交易所存在的严重非对称性是融券交易卖空威胁难以发挥作用的重要原因。本文的研究成果对于完善我国融资融券制度和业绩承诺机制具有一定的理论和现实意义。

Using data of China's listed companies that announce performance commitment from year 2011 to year 2021,this paper investigates the impact of margin trading and short selling program on the completion rate of performance commitment.We find that the completion rate of performance commitment signed by margin trading and short selling target companies is lower compared to non-target companies,and this negative impact is mainly caused by margin trading transactions.Mechanism analysis shows that margin trading and short selling program decreases the completion rate of performance commitment by intensifying managerial myopia and reducing the shareholding of institutional investors.Further analysis shows that the negative impact of margin trading and short selling program is more pronounced in companies with poor information environment,non-state-owned companies as well as companies in less competitive industries.The conclusion shows that the threat effect of short selling does not work since the asymmetry between margin trading and short selling is severe in China.On the contrary,the leverage effect of margin trading stimulates firms to pursue high stock price by announcing impractical performance commitment,which leads to the breach of contract when performance commitment expires.The results of this paper provide theoretical and practical evidences for improving China's margin trading and short selling program and performance commitment mechanism.