小股东能监督大股东吗——来自“监管型小股东”的证据

Can Minority Shareholders Supervise Majority Shareholders?——Evidence from Regulatory Minority Shareholders

本文手工收集投服中心行权数据,从大股东掏空的视角考察监管型小股东行权的公司治理效应。研究发现:首先,投服中心行权有助于抑制大股东掏空。其次,投服中心采用现场行权或行权内容涉及大股东非经营性资金占用、关联交易等事项时的治理作用更为显著;投服中心行权可以提高中小股东的股东大会出席率和议案否决率以及公司内部控制质量,强化监管机构、新闻媒体和分析师等外部机制的监督效应,进而抑制大股东掏空。本文丰富了小股东发挥治理效应的文献体系,为中小投资者保护体系合理化建构以及资本市场高质量发展提供了制度创新思路和现实依据。

This paper manually collects the data of the China Securities Investor Services Center(ISC)exercise behaviors and analyzes the effect of the regulatory minority shareholders in corporate governance,from the perspective of tunneling behavior of major shareholders.This paper finds:first,the exercise behaviors of ISC could help reduce major shareholderstunneling.Second,it was also found that the reducing effect has been enhanced when ISC exercised rights at the scene or the exercises involved non-operating cash embezzlements and related party transactions.Furthermore,the participation of ISC led a higher attendance rate of minority shareholders in general meetings accompanied by a higher veto rate and a higher quality of internal control.Moreover,the exercise behaviors of ISC also strengthened the supervision effect of external mechanisms such as regulatory agencies,medias and analysts,which thereby reduced the tunneling.We contribute to the literature in the effect of minority shareholders on corporate governance.It provides a institutional-innovation enlightenment and realistic basis for the reasonable construction of investor protection and the high-quality development of capital market.