总会计师交流任职能够改善国有企业会计信息质量吗

Can the Rotation of Chief Accountants Improve the Accounting Information Quality of State-Owned Enterprises?

如何通过有效的国资监管制度完善国有企业治理、维护国有资产安全是重要的理论和现实问题,本文以中央企业总会计师交流任职为切入点尝试回答这一问题。研究发现,总会计师交流任职能够提高国有企业的会计信息质量。机制检验发现,总会计师任期越长、中央企业开展董事会试点以及受到审计监督后,上述结果减弱。进一步地,区分交流任职的来源特征后发现,上述结果只体现在总会计师交流自非同行业企业、非同城市企业以及伴随着晋升的情况下。经济后果检验发现,总会计师交流任职通过提高会计信息质量缓解了国有企业的过度投资和超额在职消费问题。综上表明,总会计师交流任职能够增强其履职的独立性,进而加强国有企业财务管理和监督,改善国有企业治理,防止国有资产流失。本文的研究结论对于当前深化国企改革背景下加强国有资产监督、维护国有资产安全具有重要启示。

How to improve the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)and maintain the safety of state-owned assets through effective institutional arrangements for state-owned assets supervision and administration is an important theoretical and practical question.This paper attempts to answer this question by taking the rotation of chief accountants in central SOEs as the starting point.It is found that the rotation of chief accountants can improve the accounting information quality in SOEs.Mechanism analyses indicate that the above result is weakened when the tenure of chief accountants is long or after the central SOEs carry out the pilot of building a standardized board or are audited by the National Audit Office.When further considering the types of rotation,the above result is only reflected when the chief accountants come from SOEs in the different industries or different cities or the chief accountants are promoted.Economic consequence analyses indicate that the rotation of chief accountants alleviates the problem of over-investments and excess perks in SOEs by improving the accounting information quality.In summary,the rotation of chief accountants can enhance their independence and strengthen the financial management and supervision to improve the governance of SOEs and prevent the loss of state-owned assets.The research conclusion of this paper has important enlightenments for strengthening the supervision and maintaining the safety of state-owned assets under the background of deepening the reform of SOEs.