薪酬-级别倒挂与商业信用供给——基于国有集团控股上市公司的经验证据

Salary-Rank Inversion and the Supply of Credit:Evidence from Stated-Owned Enterprise Group

以往研究表明,商业信用的使用可以帮助企业扩大经营规模,是提高销售业绩的重要手段。利用2015-2019年我国A股国有集团控股上市公司为数据样本,本文实证研究发现,国有企业商业信用的使用与国有上市公司高管与其所属集团高管间出现的“薪酬-级别倒挂”现象有关,“薪酬-级别倒挂”现象的存在会增加国有上市公司对客户的商业信用供给。从“薪酬-级别倒挂”现象导致的高管辩护动机出发,高管通过使用商业信用促进销售,提升短期业绩,达到辩护其所获倒挂薪酬合理性的目的。机制分析表明,薪酬-级别倒挂通过提高企业业绩薪酬敏感度,强化了高管的薪酬辩护动机,促使企业扩大商业信用供给规模。截面分析显示,在辩护压力较大、相对业绩较低、客户集中度较高及内外部治理水平较低的企业中,高管辩护动机较强。进一步研究发现,“薪酬-级别倒挂”增加商业信用供给后,企业会出现账龄延长和账款拖延的后果,存在因商业信用扩张引发的供应链溢出效应。本文从薪酬辩护视角出发,丰富了商业信用供给动机的相关研究,为理解国有企业薪酬体制改革的政策后果提供了一定的启示。

Prior studies show that the utilization of commercial credit is crucial for enterprises to expand their scale and enhance financial performance.Using a sample of A-share state-owned listed enterprises from 2015 to 2019,this research aims to empirically investigate the influence of Salary-Rank Inversion on the supply of credit.The findings reveal that Salary-Rank Inversion greatly raises credit,with a higher degree of inversion leading to a more extensive scale of credit supply.Mechanism analysis show that Salary-Rank inversion increases the sensitivity to performance and compensation,prompting executives to formulate aggressive credit supply strategies.Furthermore,the cross-sectional tests show that executives have stronger motivation to defend in enterprises with higher defense pressure,lower relative performance,higher customer concentration and poor governance.After the increase of the trade credit,there will be consequences such as account aging and delayed payments,along with a spillover effect on credit expansion within the supply chain.This research contributes to the existing literature on the motivations behind credit supply,offering valuable insights into the policy outcomes stemming from the salary system reform in state-owned enterprises.