“股权质押新规”能抑制上市公司控股股东的私利侵占行为吗

Can the Regulation of Stock Pledge Inhibit the Self-interest Encroachment of the Controlling Shareholders of Listed Companies

本文以“股权质押新规”颁布为准自然实验场景,研究“新规”对上市公司控股股东私利侵占行为的治理效应。研究结果表明,“新规”通过降低控股股东两权分离度、上市公司的盈余管理程度,进而抑制控股股东的私利侵占行为。进一步研究发现,“新规”对内部控制水平较低的上市公司具有更强的治理效应;扩展性研究表明,“新规”能够降低公司股价崩盘风险。本文研究为“新规”实施的经济后果提供了理论支撑和经验证据,同时对监管层规范上市公司控股股东股权质押行为具有一定的政策启示。

This article takes the promulgation of the“New Regulations on Stock Pledge”as a natural experimental setting to study the governance effect of the implementation of the“New Regulations”on the behavior of controlling shareholders’private interest appropriation in listed companies.The research results show that the implementation of the“New Regulations”can restrain the controlling shareholders’private interest appropriation behavior,and the“New Regulations”have an impact on the controlling shareholders’private interest appropriation behavior by reducing the degree of separation of the two rights of controlling shareholders and reducing the degree of earnings management of listed companies.Further research finds that the“New Regulations”have a stronger governance effect on listed companies with lower levels of internal control,and the implementation of the“New Regulations”can reduce the risk of stock price collapse.This study provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for the economic consequences of the implementation of the“New Regulations”,and also has certain policy implications for the regulatory authorities to regulate the stock pledge behavior of controlling shareholders in listed companies.