混合所有制改革对国企去杠杆行为的影响:程度与方式

Mixed-ownership Reform and Deleveraging of State-owned Enterprises:Degree and Methods

去杠杆是防范与化解重大风险尤其是金融风险的重要切入点。本文从去杠杆程度和去杠杆方式两个方面,研究混合所有制改革对国企去杠杆行为的影响。研究发现:混改显著提升了国企的去杠杆程度。从去杠杆方式来看,混改显著促进了国企选择“留利”和“减短债”两种方式的去杠杆行为。进一步研究发现:混改对去杠杆的促进效应主要体现在过度负债国企中,这说明混改促进国企去除了负债中的“不合理”部分。在区分不同行政层级后发现,混改对国企去杠杆的促进效应在中央企业和地方国企中均显著成立。另外,文章发现混改显著促进了市场化水平较低地区国企的去杠杆行为,这说明混改能够在一定程度上弥补外部市场制度缺陷,发挥对国企高杠杆的治理效应。而且去杠杆后的国企经营绩效也发生了显著提升。上述研究结论在经过一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。本文的研究结论为深化推进混合所有制改革和去杠杆政策要求提供了经验证据。

Based on data of state-owned enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2018,this study examines how mixed-ownership reform affects the deleveraging behavior of state-owned enterprises(hereafter,SOEs)from the perspective of ownership structure.We find that the higher the degree of equity balance between state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders of SOEs,the more inclined they are choose to deleverage.As for the methods of deleveraging,they are more inclined to choose retained earnings and current debt repayment in the deleveraging process.Further,this effect is more pronounced for SOEs with excess leverage,in low marketization regions,and pronounced for both center SOEs and local SOEs.We also find that mixed ownership reform increases deleveraging SOEs’operating performance.The results suggest that mixed-ownership reform can efficiently promote the deleveraging behavior of SOEs in positive ways.Our study enriches the literature on mixed-ownership reform and deleverage and provides empirical evidence of the economic consequences of such reform,which is relevant for guiding future SOEs’reform and deleverage policy.