国企董事长变更、前任去向与继任负向盈余管理——基于继任董事长对前任的揭示作用分析

Chairman Turnover,Predecessor's Going and Successor's Downward Earnings Management in SOEs:An Analysis Based on the Revealing Role of Successor to Predecessor

基于市场交易背景,董事长离任前会进行正向盈余管理以最大化私有收益,因而继任在上任当年的负向盈余管理可视为对前任盈余操纵的揭露更正;但前任去往大股东单位或当地及中央政府任职所产生的前后任关系可能会抑制这种效应。基于此,本文分析国企前任董事长去向对继任负向盈余管理的影响,发现继任董事长在变更当年存在负向盈余管理行为,且该效应主要发生在前任未去往大股东单位或当地及中央政府任职时。进一步地,本文对继任董事长负向盈余管理表现出机会主义的可能性进行排除,结果支持继任负向盈余管理的纠错效应。动机检验结果表明,继任的负向盈余管理降低了企业的绩效基准,有助于继任未来薪酬的提升。根据本文研究结果,监管部门应限制国企董事长去往大股东单位任职,从而有效发挥继任负向盈余管理的治理效应。

Based on market transaction backgrounds,chairmen of the boards tend to maximize their private benefits by managing earnings upward before leaving office.Thus,the behaviors that new chairmen manage earnings downward in the year of chairman turnover could be regarded as corrections of predecessors'upward earnings management.However,the above correction effect may be weakened if former chairmen take office in large shareholder or government after leaving office.Based on these considerations,this paper analyzes the effect of former chairmen's destination on successors'downward earnings management in SOEs.The results show that new chairmen manage earnings downward in the year of chairman turnover,and the effect occurs mainly when predecessors do not take office in large shareholder or government after leaving office.At the same time,this paper tests if there is obvious opportunism in behaviors of successors'downward earnings management,and the results support correction effect rather than opportunism.The results of motivation tests indicate that behaviors that new chairmen manage earnings downward in the year of chairman turnover reduce the performance benchmark of the firm,which could increase successors'future compensation.According to the results of this paper,regulators should restrict former chairman of SOEs from taking office in the large shareholder to effectively play the role of governance effect of successors'downward earnings management.