高管权益薪酬选拔效应与企业创新

Sorting Effect of Executives’ Equity Compensations and Corporate Innovation

以2006-2016年我国上市公司实施的高管权益薪酬为研究对象,探究高管权益薪酬选拔效应对企业创新的影响及机理。构建并拟合权益薪酬选拔效应理论模型,证实了高管权益薪酬对偏好风险的高管具有选拔效应,在此基础上进行实证检验发现:(1)高管权益薪酬选拔效应能够激励企业创新,机理是保留偏好风险的高管。(2)不同权益薪酬方式中,股票期权选拔效应能有效激励创新;限制性股票选拔效应在管理层权力较大时失效;复合方式选拔效应受股票期权和限制性股票价值配比的影响。(3)高管权益薪酬选拔效应与风险承担效应对创新激励具有协同作用。本文以选拔偏好风险的高管为视角,为上市公司合理配置创新导向的高管权益薪酬、促进企业创新提供理论依据。

Based on executives’equity compensations implemented by Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2016,this paper studies the impact and mechanism of the sorting effect of executives’equity compensation on corporate innovation.We build and numerically fit a theoretical model for the sorting effect of executives’equity compensation,and confirm that the executives’equity compensation has sorting effect on risk-preferring executives.On this basis,empirical tests are carried out.Results show that:(1)Sorting effect of executives’equity compensations improves the corporate innovation input,and the mechanism is retaining risk-preferring executives.(2)Sorting effect and risk-taking effect of executives’equity compensation have synergism on innovation incentives.(3)In different modes of equity compensation,the sorting effect of stock options has significant incentive impact on innovation,while the sorting effect of restricted stocks loses efficacy when the management power is large.In addition,the sorting effect of compounding mode is affected by the value proportion of stock options and restricted stocks.From the perspective of sorting risk-preferring executives,this paper provides theoretical basis for listed firms to promote innovation inputs and to allocate executives’equity compensation.