媒体负面报道与高管腐败治理

Negative Press and Executive Corruption Governance

本文以A股上市公司为样本,检验媒体负面报道能否抑制公司高管的腐败行为。研究发现,媒体负面报道越多,公司高管下一年发生腐败行为的概率越低;在中央强力反腐时期,媒体负面报道抑制高管腐败行为的效果更强。媒体负面报道会通过提高社会关注度,引起监管部门介入,或提高反腐部门介入的概率等渠道发挥治理作用;并且发现,上述作用机制在中央强力反腐时期效果更好。进一步分析发现,重复的媒体负面报道或市场导向媒体的负面报道越多,公司高管下一年发生腐败行为的概率越低。在中央强力反腐时期,政府控制媒体的腐败治理作用能得到显著的改善。此外,本文考察了媒体负面报道的长期治理效果,发现这种治理作用能持续3年左右。本研究有助于理解媒体对公司高管腐败行为的治理作用以及中央反腐行动的实施效果。

Using the data of China’s listed companies,we examine whether negative press can inhibit corporate executives’corruption.The study finds that the more negative press,the lower the probability of corporate executives’corruption in the next year.And negative press is more effective in inhibiting executives’corruption during the period of strong anti-corruption campaign implemented by the central government.Negative press plays an important governance role by increasing the social attention,or increasing the probability of the intervention of regulatory authorities or anti-corruption departments.The effect is even stronger during the period of strong anti-corruption campaign implemented by the central government.Further analysis finds that the more repeated negative press or market-oriented negative press,the lower the probability of executives’corruption behavior in the next year.Media controlled by the government plays a better role in the governance during the period of strong anti-corruption campaign by the central government.In addition,the long-term governance effect of negative press is found to last for about 3 years.This study is helpful to understand the governance role of the media on the corruption of corporate executives and the implementation effect of the central anti-corruption campaign.