央企董事会建设与企业投资

The Pilot of the Board of Directors of Central State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Investment

央企董事会建设是推进国有企业公司治理现代化的关键点。本文以国务院国资委在央企集团层面逐步开展的董事会试点改革为准自然实验,考察了董事会建设对企业投资的影响。研究发现:央企董事会建设能降低集团的投资水平、提高投资效率,且这一影响主要体现在一般竞争类企业和规模较小的企业中,内部人控制问题的缓解是董事会建设影响企业投资行为的重要渠道。进一步研究发现,董事会建设通过改善投资最终提升了经营业绩。本文的研究结论为董事会治理的有效性提供了直接证据,亦响应了十九届四中全会关于推动国有企业治理体系和治理能力现代化的要求,丰富了中国特色现代国有企业制度的相关研究。

The pilot of board of directors of central state-owned enterprises(CSOE)is the key point to promote the modernization of SOE corporate governance.Based on the experimental reform of the board of directors gradually carried out by the SASAC at the level of CSOE groups,this paper investigates the impact of the construction of the board of directors on corporate investment.The results show that the construction of the board of directors of CSOE can reduce the investment,restrain excessive investment,and improve investment efficiency,and this effect is mainly reflected in general competitive enterprises and smaller enterprises.The mechanism test shows that the easing of the insider control is the important channels for the board construction to influence the investment behavior of enterprises.Furthermore,board building ultimately improves corporate performance by improving investment.The conclusions of this paper provide direct evidence for the effectiveness of board governance,and also respond to the requirements of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19 th CPC Central Committee on promoting the modernization of SOE governance system and governance capacity,which enriches the relevant research on the modern SOE system with Chinese characteristics.