反收购条款设立会影响企业真实盈余管理行为吗

Will the Establishment of Anti-takeover Provisions Affect the Real Earnings Management Behavior of Enterprises?

公司控制权稳定对于公司持续经营和长远发展来说至关重要。在股票全流通时代,股权竞争日趋激烈,上市公司维护控制权稳定的需求也日益增强,随之设立反收购条款的现象越发增多。本文利用反收购条款数据,实证研究了反收购条款对真实盈余管理行为的影响。实证检验发现,反收购条款设立有利于缓解真实盈余管理行为。当上市公司大股东持股比例较高、管理层薪酬以及管理层持股比例较高时,反收购条款缓解真实盈余管理的效果更为明显。进一步研究发现,反收购条款通过缓解真实盈余管理行为,从而提升公司长期价值。本文研究结论有助于深刻理解国内上市公司设立反收购条款的行为本质,同时也为监管机构制定反收购制度提供了政策建议。

The stability of corporate control is very important for the sustainable operation and long-term development of the company.In the era of full circulation of shares,the competition for equity is becoming increasingly fierce,the demand for listed companies to maintain the stability of control is increasing,and the phenomenon of setting up anti-takeover provisions is also increasing.This paper uses the data of anti-takeover provisions collected by hand to empirically test the relationship between anti-takeover provisions and real earnings management.The study found that the establishment of anti-takeover provisions is helpful to alleviate the behavior of real earnings management.When the shareholding proportion of major shareholders of listed companies is higher,and the proportion of management compensation and shareholding is higher,the effect of anti-takeover provisions on alleviating real earnings management is more obvious.Further study found that the anti-takeover clause can enhance the long-term value of the company by alleviating the real earnings management behavior.The conclusion of this paper not only helps to deeply understand the behavioral nature of anti-takeover provisions of domestic listed companies,but also provides policy recommendations for regulators to formulate anti-takeover system.