产品市场竞争优势与双重股权结构选择——基于外部股东视角

Product Market Competition Advantage and the Choice of Dual Class Share Structure——Based on the Perspective of External Shareholders

本文将双重股权结构视为拥有高倍投票权的内部股东与同股同权外部股东的集体选择,以1991-2018年赴美上市的中概股公司为样本,从选择原因和选择结果两个视角探讨外部股东为何自愿放弃投票权而选择双重股权公司。研究发现:企业在产品市场中的竞争优势越强,上市时选择双重股权结构的概率越大,这在新经济公司样本中表现的更明显;而选择该结构后也将更有利于实现企业绩效和股东价值。从机理来看,产品市场竞争优势通过显示内部股东的能力来影响外部股东对双重股权公司的选择。研究启示外部股东可参考企业在产品市场上的竞争优势来选择投资双重股权公司,而上市公司也应增加其产品市场竞争优势的信息披露以加强外部股东利益保护。

In this paper,the dual class share structure is regarded as the collective choice result of internal shareholders with high voting rights and external shareholders with one share one vote.This paper discusses the reasons why the external shareholders choose the dual class share company from the perspective of competitive advantage in the product market before the company goes public.Based on the samples of the listed companies in the United States,this paper makes a variety of tests from the perspectives of selection probability and selection results,which show that the higher the competitive advantage of the enterprises in the product market,the greater the probability of choosing the dual class share structure when the enterprises are listed.The policy enlightenment of this conclusion is to strengthen the information disclosure about the market competition of the products when the dual class share enterprises are listed.