非国有股东超额委派董事能否提高会计信息质量?——基于国企混改背景

Do Directors Excessively Appointed by Non-state-owned Shareholders Improve the Accounting Information Quality:Evidence from State-owned Enterprise Mixed Reform

国有企业混合所有制改革是新时代全面深化改革的关键。本文以2009-2018年国有上市公司为样本,手工收集非国有股东持股比例和委派董事数据,计算非国有股东超额委派董事情况,以此考察其对国企会计信息质量的影响。基于股权与控制权非对等逻辑,我们发现非国有股东仅仅委派董事并不能改善国企会计信息质量,只有超额委派董事(即控制权超越股权),才能有效地提升国企会计信息质量,而且这种提升在央企和市场化程度较好的地区比较显著。进一步研究发现,非国有股东超额委派董事还能向资本市场传递特质信息,并抑制负面消息积累,有效地降低了国企股价同步性和崩盘风险。该研究在非国有股东参与国企混改研究领域进行了视角、内容和变量的创新,其结果为国企混改提供了一定的参考价值。

State-owned enterprise mixed ownership reform is the key to comprehensively deepening reform in the new era.This paper takes the state-owned listed companies from 2009 to 2018 as a sample,manually collects the data of non-state-owned shareholders’shareholding ratio and appointed directors,calculates the situation of non-state-owned shareholders over-appointed directors,and examines its impact on the quality of state-owned enterprises’accounting information.Based on the logic of non-equivalence between equity and control,we find that only appointing directors by non-state shareholders cannot improve the quality of accounting information of state-owned enterprises.Only by over-appointing directors(that is,control over equity)can effectively improve the quality of accounting information of state-owned enterprises.The improvement is more pronounced in central enterprises and regions with better marketization.Further research has found that over-appointing directors by non-state-owned shareholders can also deliver characteristic information to the capital market and inhibit the accumulation of negative news,effectively reducing the synchronization of state-owned enterprise stock prices and the risk of collapse.The research has carried out the innovation of perspective,content and variables in the field of non-state-owned shareholders’participation in the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,and the results provide a certain reference value for the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises.